DECLASSIFICATION RECOMMENDED x XX

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S. R. Sapirie

DECEMBER 21, 1965

US AEC GERMANTOWN, MD.

D. E. GEORGE, DIRECTOR DIVISION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT

INFO/P.A. MORRIS, DIV. OF OPERATIONAL SAFETY, US AEC, GERMANTOWN, MD.

F. P. BARANOWSKI, DIV. OF PRODUCTION, US AEC, GERMANTOWN, MD.

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G. F. QUINN, ASST. GM FOR PLANS & PRODUCTION, US AEC, GERMANTOWN, MD.

C. A. NELSON, DIV. OF INSPECTION US AEC, GERMANTOWN, MD.

/ J. A. WATERS, JR., DIV. OF SECURITY, US AEC, GERMANTOWN, MD.

SUBJECT: INITIAL REPORT OF APPARENT EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION CAUSING ACCIDENTAL LOSS OF ENRICHED URANIUM CONTAINED IN CONDENSATE IN SALVAGE RECOVERY AT Y-12 PLANT. PARA

THE Y-12 PLANT HAS REPORTED THE LOSS OF APPROXIMATELY 1500 GRAMS OF URANIUM IN URANIUM BEARING SOLUTIONS FROM THE DAFFODIAL SALVAGE THE 24-HOUR COMPOSITE SAMPLE OF CONDENSATE FOR RECOVERY AREA. DECEMBER 2, 1965, FROM THE GENERAL SALVAGE EVAPORATORS, ANALYZED IN THE PROCESS LABORATORY ON THE FIRST SHIFT ON DECEMBER 3, 1965, SHOWED A LEVEL OF APPROXIMATELY 200 PPM URANIUM, AND THE EVAPORATORS: THE NEXT SHIFT STARTED THE EVAPORATORS AGAIN AND TOOK WERE SHUT DOWN. nath 8,3 FREQUENT SAMPLES TO ESTABLISH LEVEL OF URANIUM IN THE CONDENSATE. THESE SAMPLES SHOWED THAT THE EVAPORATORS AT THIS TIME WERE AGAIN RUNNING

PARA NORMALLY.

W. B. Kenna; ag ... Room, ΆŒ ► 3-4604 SURNAME >

GABRIEL HARCIANTE, ORD CLASSIFICATION OFFICER

DATE >

Form AEC-818 (Rev. 9-53)

## ONFIDENTIAL

D. E. GEORGE, US AEC, HQ. - 2 -

**DECEMBER 21, 1965** 

OTHER SAMPLES OF THE DECEMBER 2nd, 24-HOUR COMPOSITE WERE ANALYZED IN THE PLANT LABORATORIES ON DECEMBER 15th, AND THESE RESULTS SHOWED APPROXIMATELY 700 PPM URANIUM. THE VARIANCE BETWEEN THE PROCESS LABORATORY AND PLANT LABORATORY RESULTS IS NOT UNEXPECTED SINCE THE PROCESS LABORATORY USES A FLUORIMETRIC PROCEDURE, AND THE PLANT LABORATORY USES A COLORIMETRIC METHOD AT THAT LEVEL OF URANIUM. PARA

AN INVESTIGATION WAS STARTED IMMEDIATELY BY Y-12 TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THE HIGH URANIUM CONTENT OF THE DECEMBER 2nd, 24-HOUR COMPOSITE SAMPLE. RECONSTRUCTION OF EVENTS INDICATE THAT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE FAILURE OF THE FEED VALVE TO COMPLETELY CLOSE AT SHIFT CHANGE ALLOWED THE FEED SOLUTION TO BACK UP IN THE EQUIPMENT, AND ON RE-STARTING THE EVAPORATORS, CONCENTRATE SOLUTION RAN OVER INTO THE CONDENSATE HANDLING EQUIPMENT. A REVIEW OF PROCESS EQUIPMENT INDICATED THAT THE CONSTANT HEAD OVERFLOW LINE WAS SO INTER-CONNECTED TO OTHER PROCESS EQUIPMENT THAT, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES INDICATED ABOVE, THE INCIDENT COULD HAPPEN. THE PIPING CHANGES NECESSARY TO ASSURE THAT THIS SITUATION COULD NOT RECUR WERE MADE IMMEDIATELY. ALSO A CHANGE WAS MADE IN OPERATING PROCEDURES WHEREBY THE MAXIMUM SPECIFIC GRAVITY OF THE PRODUCT WAS REDUCED TO ASSURE THAT NO BOIL-OVER OCCURRED IN THE

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Form AEC-818 (Rev. 9-53)

CONFIDENTIAL

D. E. GEORGE, US AEC, HQ.

- 3 -

**DECEMBER 21, 1965** 

THE ABOVE INCIDENT IS CONSIDERED A TEMPORARY MALFUNCTION OF

EQUIPMENT SINCE NO DIFFICULTY IN MAINTAINING NOMINAL OPERATING

CONDITIONS RELATIVE TO URANIUM CONTENT IN THE CONDENSATE HAD BEEN

ENCOUNTERED PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT NOR HAS ANY DIFFICULTY BEEN NOTED

SINCE.THE CHANGES MADE BY Y-12 ARE ADEQUATE TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE. PARA

Y-12 IS PREPARING A REPORT OF THE INCIDENT. THE REPORT WILL BE

FORWARDED TO YOU WHEN RECEIVED. PARA

THE LOCAL OFFICE OF THE FBI HAS BEEN INFORMED OF THIS INCIDENT FOR

INFORMATION PURPOSES. NO INVESTIGATION HAS BEEN REQUESTED. OPA:WBK

CC: R. C. ARMSTRONG
F. P. CALLAGHAN

BC Roy Williams

## CONFIDENTIAL

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DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORIZED

GABRIEL HARCIANTE, ORD CLASSIFICATION OFFICER

NAME (ADD) - ORGANIZATION

2/29/9/

GROUP 1

Excluded from automation downgrading and declassification

FM S R SAPIRIE USAEC OAKRIDGE TENN

TO D E GEORGE USAEC GERMANTOWN MD

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CONFIDENTIAL/RD GROUP ONE. SUBJECT: INITIAL REPORT OF APPARENT EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION CAUSING ACCIDENTAL LOSS OF ENRICHED URANIUM CONTAINED IN CONDENSATE IN SALVAGE RECOVERY AT Y-12 PLANT.

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